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International narratives on Argentina’s recovery from the crisis of 2001-02 tend to 
emphasize the role of rising commodity prices and growing demand from China. 
Argentina is said to have been ‘lucky’, saved by global demand for its agricultural 
exports. The international narrative has also been used by local agricultural exporters to 
justify their objections against higher export taxes during periods of high commodity 
prices. These narratives are not correct. Data on the country’s recovery show that it was 
not led by agricultural exports but was fuelled by urban demand and production. When 
the Convertibility period ended and the peso was devalued in 2002, price increases for 
imports stimulated the production of domestic goods and services for consumers. This 
production in turn generated multiplier effects which supported small and medium-sized 
firms and helped to create many new jobs. This later produced a revival of the 
construction and then the manufacturing sectors as well. 
  .../.. 
 
Keywords: economic crisis, urban sector, economic recovery 
JEL classification: O4, O54, R1  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU-WIDER 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 
The contribution of the campo (rural sector) to the recovery came later in 2004 and 
thereafter, as the prices of commodities increased and the planting of larger and larger 
areas to grow soya and other crops had huge payoffs. These exports certainly helped 
build up the country’s reserves and fiscal strength, but they cannot be credited with 
playing the key role in stimulating the recovery. Agricultural exports later generated 
much additional income and eventually public revenue, but Argentina’s recovery was 
largely a ‘demand-led recovery’, located in urban areas where 80 per cent of Argentines 
work and live.  
 
The Argentine case is significant because it suggests that the urban locus of 
macroeconomic phenomena in Latin America deserves much more research and 
appreciation from policymakers. The historical foci in Latin American urban studies 
have included squatter settlements and infrastructure deficits, social exclusion, civil 
society mobilization, decentralization, and the ‘right to the city’ claimed by excluded 
groups. But these bodies of work have ignored the central fact that more than 60 per 
cent of GDP in all Latin American countries comes from urban-based economic 
activities. The economic and social futures of Latin America lie in urban areas which 
are at once the sites of productivity and the loci of urban poverty. The impacts of high 
intra-urban inequality are key factors in undermining needed improvements in 
productivity. The capacity of Latin American economies to withstand the impact of 
global economic crises and other exogenous events will depend on how economic 




The study of urban growth in Latin America has been dominated since the 1960s by 
studies of housing and squatter settlements. The discovery of the barriadas of Lima 
(Turner and Fichter 1972), the favelas of Rio (Perlman 1976), or the villas of Buenos 
Aires (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989) by leading urban scholars presaged more than 
three decades of intensive operational work by national and municipal governments, 
often with support from international institutions. A preoccupation with the rapid 
growth of slums evolved over time into a concern with residential infrastructure, 
particularly water supply and sanitation, and security of tenure, leading also to a call for 
‘the right to the city’. It is revealing to note that these themes might be characterized as 
‘having entered the city through the house and the bathroom,’ rather than through the 
place of work or income generation. This entry point has over time dominated the 
consideration of the city within Latin America, with some exceptions such as the 
experiences in Brazil such as Curitiba or Porto Alegre, or in Bogota, Mexico City, and 
Santiago with public transport. It also fits easily within a list of issues which I have 
termed the ‘global formulation of the urban’. 
Looking at urban research and urban practice as a whole, the global formulation of the 
urban, as reflected in the past policy work of the World Bank, the regional development 
banks, the Cities Alliance, and most institutions of the United Nations system, currently 
includes the following propositions: 
−  Urban demographic growth will continue, regardless of urban economic 
conditions (UNFPA 2007); 
−  Urban demographic growth has spread beyond primate cities to secondary urban 
centres;  
−  Cities and towns remain the destination of both national and international 
migrants; 
−  Urban slum conditions, meaning housing, land, and infrastructure deserve 
priority attention on the grounds that poor living conditions are a key 
determinant of urban poverty and also undermine labour productivity(UN 
Habitat 2003); 
−  Urban water supply is a major concern, both in terms of aggregate supply with 
the marginal cost of water increasing in most cities in developing countries and 
in terms of its distribution, particularly to poor communities; 
−  Urban sanitation is recognized as playing a key role in controlling water-borne 
diseases and being a major determinant of urban health status of individuals, 
households, and communities; 
−  Insecure land tenure is a dominant feature of slum growth (UN Habitat n.d.); 
−  Urban land use patterns usually include central business districts and 
surrounding slum areas expanding out into the metropolitan periphery; 
−  Urban density of central areas is declining (Angel 2006);  
−  Most national and local governments do not manage urban land resources 
efficiently nor do they sufficiently capture increasing land values at a 
commensurate rate; 2 
−  Land markets are highly imperfect and frequently significantly affected by 
specific local regulations affecting both supply and demand; 
−  Extension of urban infrastructure has been guided less by public policy than by 
private investment; 
−  Urban cultural and physical heritage deserves protection in the face of 
unmanaged growth; 
−  Urban governance is weak due to scarce financial and technical capacity of 
urban governments and a lack of national government attention to urban 
problems; 
−  Civil society and community-based organizations can fill the gap of poor public 
sector performance and can provide many needed service; 
−  The importance of gender is recognized as significant in urban policies and 
management, but few internationally-supported operational policies and 
programmes have actually improved gender equity in cities; 
−  The management of urban externalities in most cities in poor countries is very 
weak, specifically reflected in deteriorating urban environmental conditions, 
particularly in relation to solid waste management and air pollution, and 
decaying physical infrastructure (Prud’homme, Huntzinger and Kopp 2004); 
−  Most urban development plans and policies ignore local ecosystem viability and 
constraints; 
−  Despite several generations of analytic and policy work on urban public finance, 
most cities lack a credible sufficient financial base to finance long-term assets, 
whether public or private; 
−  Urban safety and security is an increasing problem, reflected in growing crime 
rates, evictions, and so-called urban natural disasters (UN Habitat 2007); 
−  A growing share of urban employment and income is provided by the informal 
sector; 
−  The efficacy of urban planning as a discipline and tool is thus regarded with 
increasing scepticism; and 
−  Many of these problems are reflected in the process of growing urban 
differences and intra-urban inequality affecting most cities.  
This list is not intended to be comprehensive, nor is it ordered in terms of priorities for 
policy or research. However, this conventional global wisdom about urban issues does 
suggest a view of the city which largely is independent of time and space and, despite 
the emphasis on demographic and spatial growth, is relatively static. It ignores other 
changes at different scales, whether at the global, regional, national, or local levels, and 
fails to acknowledge their impacts on cities through changes in prices, value, and costs.  
This view of cities is perceived and articulated as relatively independent and insensitive 
to major phenomena such as the current global economic crisis, national political 
change, local ecosystem collapse, or local disasters. Moreover, this formulation does not 
acknowledge the dependency of local urban conditions on macroeconomic or global 
financial conditions. Indeed, this formulation is quite striking in its general absence of 
linkages and the continuing independence of this model of cities from economics or 3 
ecology, whether in the form of global economic forces or the characteristics of local 
economies such as their sources of capital formation, productivity, employment, and 
incomes, or in terms of local natural resource endowments and landscape. Most, though 
not all, urban analysts are not seeing the larger context.1 
These observations about urban research and policy analyses are particularly 
problematic when considered in light of the current global economic crisis and its 
already heavy impact on developing countries. Whether one cites the drop in 
employment in Brazil, the forced expulsion of 20 million now unemployed urban 
workers from Chinese cities in December 2008 alone, the decline in the global and 
regional demand for commodities and manufactured goods produced in cities, or the 
observed contraction of many domestic economies over the last year, it is apparent that 
the global economic crisis is undermining the economic growth and development 
prospects of countries which are already facing growing numbers of poor people living 
in cities. This is certainly the case in Latin America. 
2  The case of Argentina: Recovering from the crisis of 2001-02 
Within this context, the case of Argentina is important to understand because its 
recovery from the crisis of 2001-02 offers significant insights on how urbanized and 
middle-income countries can actually survive and recover from macroeconomic crises. 
This experience also suggests new conclusions about the role of urban economies within 
periods of macroeconomic change. This paper presents this experience, focusing 
particular attention on the urban economy, and offers some suggestions for broader 
development policy and macroeconomic debates.  
2.1  Origins of the crisis 
It is impossible to understand modern Argentina without appreciating the significant 
development accomplishments of the decade from 1946 to 1955 during the government 
o f  G e n e r a l  J u a n  P e r o n .  T h i s  p e r i o d  w a s  m a r k e d  b y  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  a  n a t i o n a l  
industry protected by import substitution policies, the expansion and distribution of 
public services including education, health, social security, and housing, and major 
improvements in literacy, longevity, and income levels for the vast majority of the 
population. In the post-war period Argentina could afford the establishment of a welfare 
state which brought a high level of income and wellbeing to a relatively small 
population of 35 million people living in a vast national territory.  
This period, while remembered nostalgically, nonetheless could not escape either the 
shifting pressures of either the post-war global economy or the cold war. Political 
instability reached Argentina in 1955 with the overthrow of Peron who went into an 
18-year exile in Spain. He returned to Argentina in very different economic 
circumstances in 1973, again was elected president but he lived only for a year. His 
wife, Isabel Peron, became president until the military coup of 24 March 1976 when 
Argentina entered almost seven years of military dictatorship, massive repression, and 
                                                 
1  Exceptions include World Bank (2009) and Asian Development Bank (2008). 4 
the deaths of 30,000 citizens through state-sponsored terrorism. Thousands more left the 
country to seek safety and exile outside of Argentina.  
This history and the military period had several major consequences that contributed to 
the crisis of 2001. First, the military government literally eliminated the voices of 
political opposition which might have led to more public debate over economic policies 
after the return to democracy in 1983. Second, the military government dramatically 
increased the national debt. Further, the management of the economy under Economy 
Minister Martinez de Hoz involved a rapid liberalization and opening up of the 
economy to global trade and competition, leading to a sustained process of de-
industrialization in Argentina which contributed to rising unemployment and inequality. 
Thousands of Argentine factories and businesses closed during the 1980s and 1990s.  
The economic legacy of the military period immediately appeared in the 1980s during 
the presidency of the late Raul Alfonsin as rising debt, fiscal crisis, and eventually 
uncontrolled hyper-inflation which led to Alfonsin’s early exit in 1989. By June 1985 
the economy minister, Juan Vital Sourrouille, had introduced new plans for ‘shock 
therapy’ with the Plan Austral intended to stabilize the economy through devaluation, a 
fixed exchange rate, and a drop in interest rates. This Plan, however, proved unable to 
balance the diverse pressures of salaries, prices, foreign trade, and interest rates. 
Political pressures from agriculture, the unions, and disagreements among the many 
economic policymakers themselves further complicated a difficult balancing act in an 
unfavourable economic environment, particularly as the impact of growing debt was 
beginning to be felt after 1982. In June 1987, the government signed an agreement with 
the IMF promising to further devalue the currency and to reduce the fiscal pressure on 
the national budget by privatizing many public enterprises.  
This was the backdrop to the ascendancy and presidency of Carlos Menem who 
promised in 1989 to control inflation and provide economic stability. This stability was 
assured after 1991 through the pegging of the Argentine peso to the US dollar and the 
adoption of the Convertibility Law introduced by economy minister Domingo Cavallo. 
This ‘hard peg’ allowed security for investors, savers, and led to strong economic 
growth from 1991 to late 1994 when Argentina felt the impact of the Tequila Crisis in 
Mexico.  
The success of the Convertibility Law was accompanied by the adoption of many 
measures to further liberalize the Argentine economy, including capital and trade flows, 
banking regulations which led to the arrival of many foreign banks in the 1990s, and 
privatization of public services from water, electricity, transportation, tele-
communications, garbage collection, and mail. The Argentine privatization programme 
was the most rapid and comprehensive of any developing country. Indeed, Argentina 
privatized more public services in two years than Britain did in ten years under 
Margaret Thatcher. In some sectors such as telecommunications this led to significant 
and immediate improvements while in others, such as water, they were much slower 
and incomplete (Azpiazu 1994). Most importantly, the security of the peso tied to the 
US dollar attracted foreign investment from many sources, particularly from European 
countries such as Spain, France, and Italy, and contributed to what initially appeared as 
a vibrant, growing economy. Foreign investors were attracted by monetary security and 
the promise of an easy expatriation of profits. Spanish companies alone withdrew 
US$45 billion during the 1990s (Cecchini and Zicolillo 2002).  5 
This picture began to darken after 1995 as the Tequila Crisis increased the cost of 
capital for servicing Argentina’s debt and its borrowing to cover fiscal deficits. The 
artificial over-valuation of the peso also hindered the growth of Argentine exports and 
weakened the external account, as Argentines imported many products. A chronic trade 
balance deficit developed. External shocks such as the East Asian financial crisis in 
1997, the Russia crisis in 1998, and later Brazil which devalued the real in 1999 all 
increased the cost of capital for Argentina. This began to show up in the form of 
reduced investment, increased unemployment, growing poverty and inequality, 
difficulties in servicing debt, and in growing fiscal deficits (Frenkel 2002: 33-50; 
Damill, Frenkel and Maurizio 2002).  
Growing economic difficulty led to repeated requests by the Menem government for 
financial support to the IMF which provided resources to its ‘poster child’ of the 1990s. 
The conditions for this support, however, were repeated calls for fiscal adjustment, 
further market reforms such as the liberalizing of the labour market, and various tax 
laws and financial regulations. Menem followed most of this advice and, evoking the 
fear of inflation and monetary instability, continued to promise that despite the 
country’s economic difficulties, the Convertibility Law would be maintained. 
As the economy adjusted—in fact contracted—it became increasingly obvious that the 
government would have serious difficulties in repaying its debt now over US$180 
billion. External markets and rating agencies were conscious of this deteriorating 
situation, with the country’s risk rating dropping by the day. It eventually fell below the 
risk rating of Nigeria in 1999—clearly a nonsensical comparison—but which 
demonstrated that, even with its physical and human infrastructure and extraordinary 
economic potential, global financial markets were only interested in the short-term 
capacity of Argentina to pay its debt. 
It is generally agreed that the Convertibility period can be divided into two stages, the 
first from 1991 to early 1995, when the economy expanded at a rapid pace, and a 
second, a deepening recession induced by the Tequila Crisis, which included changes in 
the labour market, further de-industrialization as many Argentine firms were unable to 
compete in now open markets, and a deterioration of the income distribution. Capital 
flows played a key role in this process, supporting growth in the first phase, and then 
becoming increasingly expensive and hesitant as negative signs appeared about the 
country’s economic performance (Frenkel 2002: 34-5). 
If there was increasing international concern about the sustainability of this situation, 
there were also many domestic indicators of economic and social distress. 
Unemployment was the most obvious indicator, as the ratio of fulltime employed to 
population began to fall to a new low in 1996, even below its 1990 level (ibid.: 36). This 
was worsened by the influx of imported goods and the drop in the domestic demand for 
labour. It can also be shown that volatility in external financial markets was 
mechanically transmitted directly to the domestic Argentine economy, because the hard 
peg to the dollar meant it was impossible to adjust the value of the peso as external 
conditions changed (ibid.: 45). The consequences of these changes in employment and 
declining real household incomes included school dropouts, crime, and drug use. 
By 2000, Argentina’s per capita income in purchasing power parity was about 
US$12,000, well above any other country in Latin America and exceeded only by Korea 
among emerging market economies (Cline 2003: 7). The country had the highest 6 
literacy in Latin America and the lowest infant mortality with the exception of Chile. 
But these aggregate numbers masked the fact that Argentina was quickly becoming a 
society of separate worlds.  
A 1998 press article entitled ‘The Distribution of Income: Each Time More Unequal’, 
showed that the top 20 per cent of the population received 53.2 per cent of income, 
while the poorest 20 per cent received only 4.2 per cent. The data from INDEC showed 
that the bottom 10 per cent actually received only 1.4 per cent of income, while the top 
10 per cent received 35.8 per cent (Bermudez 1998: 22). The 1990s had generated 
important increases in income for many households, but the combination of increased 
inequality and differences, poverty, the numbers of people working informally, and the 
level of delinquency all demonstrated important problems which differed from the self-
perception of Argentines in the 1950s or 1960s of their country as a prosperous, largely 
middle-class society. 
In Buenos Aires, middle- and upper-income households benefitting from economic 
growth under Convertibility increased their consumption with one peso equal to one 
dollar. They moved into some of the more than the then 300 new gated communities 
surrounding the federal capital district, where they developed suburban life styles 
resembling the car-dominated cultures of the USA. Their life styles separated them from 
the mass of urban and, indeed, national population (Svampa 2005, 2001; Castelo 2007; 
Cohen 2007: 270-313). This was reflected in the growing perception of inequality in 
access to infrastructure, public services, and the quality of living conditions. An analysis 
of public expenditures within the federal capital from 1991 to 1997 showed that 11.5 
per cent of the population received 68 per cent of public expenditures, creating in effect 
‘five cities of Buenos Aires’ with the distribution of services by neighbourhood 
correlating strongly with poverty, crime, and environmental quality (Cohen and 
Debowicz 2001: 3-20). 
Within the metropolitan area as a whole, there was a growing spread of squatter 
settlements, where almost one million people were living without piped water supply 
and in-house sanitation. This problem was raised as one of the ‘great pending issues for 
Argentina’ in an article in early January 2000, where data from SIEMPRO, a 
programme within the national ministry of social development, was presented to 
illustrate the growing nexus of slum problems which was making metropolitan Buenos 
Aires similar to the slum areas of other cities in developing countries (O’Donnell 2000). 
A front-page story in La Nacion in February 2000 reported a 15 per cent growth of the 
population in villas miserias in the wealthier federal capital of some 14,000 people in 
two years, reaching 100,000 persons (Palacios 2000: 1 and 14). 
2.2  The crisis unfolds 
By December 2001, the room for manoeuvre by the government of President Fernando 
de la Rua had narrowed considerably. There was growing international and domestic 
recognition that the country could not pay its external debt. Foreign exchange and bank 
deposits were fleeing the country. Finance minister Cavallo ordered a limitation of 
withdrawals from personal bank accounts of 250 pesos per week, a measure known as 
the corralito which led to street protests and demonstrations, and the declaration of a 
state of siege by the president. Twenty-six people were killed in Buenos Aires on 18-20 7 
December, and on 20 December, de la Rua gave up the presidency, escaping the Casa 
Rosada by helicopter. 
The country had three transitional presidents in the 10 days to follow, eventually settling 
on Eduardo Duhalde, former vice-president under Menem, who helped to stabilize the 
economic and political situation over the next six months. This process included 
declaring a default on Argentina’s foreign debt, de-valuing the peso from one per US 
dollar to a floating rate assumed to start at three per dollar, and re-establishing the 
legitimacy of the central government in a federal country in which individual provinces 
were even issuing their own currency to meet their bills and other obligations. This 
situation was closely followed by the international media: the default affected citizens 
and institutions from many countries, the default appeared to be a dangerous precedent 
for other debt-ridden countries, and the case of Argentina raised dramatic questions 
about the value of the advice of the IMF, which in 1999 had heralded Argentina as its 
poster child.  
With hindsight, it is interesting to read the many external critiques of Argentina and its 
political leadership, all of whom blamed Argentina for the situation. These included 
people such as Martin Wolf from The Financial Times, the editorial page of The New 
York Times,  The Economist, Jeffrey Sachs, and Paul O’Neill, the US Treasury 
Secretary. The strident blaming of Argentina for this situation is well-captured in the 
writing of Jeffrey Sachs (2002) at this time: 
I do not know of another nation with Argentina’s capacity to abuse, 
manipulate, freeze, confiscate and periodically replace the national 
currency and the contracts set in it. The currency board was introduced 
precisely to break this record. Dollarization would have ended it 
decisively. 
The Duhalde government has shown two very different faces in its first 
few days. One is rather responsible, calling on the public to accept large 
shocks and fiscal austerity as the economy reorients to a more realistic 
exchange rate. 
The other is the red-hot Peronism of the past. Mr Duhalde himself has 
been a leader of this approach, claiming ominously that Argentina’s 
collapse reflects an alliance of political power with financial power at the 
expense of industry during the past decade. The truth is much more 
prosaic: the currency board was a good effort that failed. 
After further criticizing the new government’s attempts to address the crisis, Mr Sachs 
(2002) concedes: 
Devaluation, with the right accompanying policies, might still work. Yet, 
in practice, we may well be on a course marked by a flagrant violation of 
property rights, growing confusion and corruption, arbitrariness and 
escalating social unrest.  
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3  The path to recovery 
Looking back, the year 2002 was the worst of times, with only a glimmer of hope that a 
recovery was on the way. In the first three-quarters of 2002, growth stopped and 
unemployment grew dramatically, approaching 30 per cent. The economy was also 
feeling the impact of the January 2002 devaluation of the peso, which meant that prices 
for food and other essential goods were going up. Higher prices pushed more people 
below the poverty line, with the number reaching by May 2002 an astonishing 56 per 
cent of the Argentine population below the poverty line. Expenditures within the 
economy were weak because individuals had their savings locked up in the corralito 
and because the government had few resources to spend. 
But the key consequence of this situation was that local producers and firms slowly 
began to meet local demand, and it was this local production, with its multiplying 
effects, that triggered what has been described as the first phase of the recovery (Damill 
et al. 2006). These authors argue that export prices and terms of trade cannot explain the 
restart of GDP growth, noting that the average price of exports was still falling in 2002 
and that the terms of trade dropped further, with improvement only coming in 2003. 
They conclude that: 
Recovery was actually bolstered by the shift in relative prices caused by 
the devaluation and also by an adequate set of policies that, despite its 
flaws and ambiguities, nevertheless succeeded in stabilizing the foreign 
exchange market and domestic prices and recuperating the basic 
macroeconomic equilibria (idem). 
The conclusion therefore from this process is that in this period—from late 2002 
through 2003 to the second quarter of 2004—the recovery of the economy was being 
led by domestic demand, most of it in cities and towns where 80 per cent of the 
Argentine people lived and worked. As prices stabilized, the private sector took 
advantage of changes in relative prices and began to produce for the domestic market 
which could no longer afford so many imported items. Starting in mid-2002, domestic 
production grew rapidly and absorbed domestic demand. Exports were still weak in this 
period. Real wages began to increase after the 4th quarter of 2002. Inflation slowed 
down and dropped to less than 1 per cent for the next two years. Unemployment also 
dropped due to depreciation of the peso. As employment grew, it further stimulated 
private consumption and generated more employment and higher incomes, helping at 
the aggregate level to contribute to rise in real wages (Damill et al. 2006: 16).  
The recovery in this second phase is remarkable because it was truly domestic and 
demand-led. Investment grew by 40.9 per cent in this phase and contributed to 55 per 
cent of the growth of GDP. Investment came from the growing profits of individual 
firms. Damill et al. point to ‘a wealth effect’ which proved to be particularly important 
for investment in construction. In fact the construction sector accounted for 56 per cent 
of the investment in this phase. The other 44 per cent of investment came from 
investment in needed capital goods. The news was good, as long as the outstanding debt 
of the country was forgotten.  
While businessmen were beginning to feel in the last quarter of 2002 that the economy 
was turning the corner, the conditions in the country were nevertheless deplorable. On 
17 January 2003, La Nacion reported in a front page story reported that 50 per cent of 9 
Argentine children under 2 years old suffered from anaemia (Bar 2003: 1, 18). Almost 
15 million Argentines, 40 per cent of the population, were not receiving basic 
nutritional requirements. This study by the Centro de Estudios sobre Nutricion Infantil 
presented data showing that rising food prices and declining incomes had serious 
worsened the country’s food situation, particularly for the poorest sections of the 
population. Under-weight births dramatically increased the risks of infant mortality. 
Pictures of malnourished children in Tucuman shown on television and published in the 
press earlier in 2002 had shocked the country and had impressed on many Argentines 
that their perception of Argentina being a first world country was far from the reality.  
The Tucuman situation had presented three problems for Argentines. First, the level of 
poverty and malnutrition was severe throughout the country. In new stories of 21
st 
November 2002, it was reported that 3 children were dying each day of hunger or of 
diseases linked to poverty. This was shocking in a country which produced enormous 
quantities of food. Second, in the province of Tucuman alone 359 children had died of 
malnutrition since the beginning of 2002, showing the location of the need (Olivan 
2002: 24-6). Third, despite both government and civil society efforts to provide aid, 
institutional obstacles had stopped the delivery of food. La Nacion had reported in 
November 2002 that supplies which had arrived in the Port of Buenos Aires on the 5th 
of August 2002, were still in the port. The Tucuman situation became highly symbolic, 
as some newspapers and magazines compared Tucuman to Biafra of the 1960s, an 
allusion which further shocked and angered many Argentines. 
3.1  Turning from economics to politics 
By early 2003, with President Duhalde having taken himself out of the running for the 
presidency in 2003 elections, the country’s attention was beginning to focus on who 
would be the next president. A wholesale rejection of the country’s political leadership 
in 2001 and 2002 was reflected in the phrase ‘Que vayan todos!’ or ‘Out with 
everyone!’ In May 2003, the country elected Nestor Kirchner, the governor of resource-
rich Santa Cruz Province in the south of the country, as its new president. 
Kirchner had been very critical of previous governments and the crisis conditions of the 
country. He had observed in a book in 2003: 
The state must recover control of the macroeconomic instruments and 
support a model of production and work (ibid: 22). 
The search is to combine production, work, import substitution, take 
advantage of technological capacity, deepen traditional exports, 
consolidate those which can bring large benefits, and, penetrate specific 
markets in the world…We must make a big investment in public works, 
infrastructure works to redefine the productive profile of the country for 
the development of agro-food industries, tourism, energy, mining, 
software and new technologies as principal motors, without leaving aside 
support for exports of products from sectors such as textiles, shoes, 
wineries, or fruit. 
We must actively develop agro-industries. Agriculture, livestock, and all 
the specialties within primary sector activity need machines, technology, 10 
innovation, development and invention, and uninterrupted research for 
the possibilities of primary products and the development of 
manufacturing linked to the countryside (ibid.: 30). 
In Argentina we must think strategically. We must take into account that 
there are asymmetries in the international markets, where our products 
are not competitive. Therefore we must subsidize the producer  …  we 
need industrial policy (ibid.: 33). 
He argued: 
In the decade of the 1990s the market and the economy disconnected 
from the State and politics, in a tacit acceptance of the end of history and 
an explicit acceptance of the theory of trickle-down… I say that trickle-
down is a theory of misery. It is true that the market organizes 
economically, but it does not articulate socially. We need to find ‘an 
intelligent state’. 
I believe in a national project. I don’t know why this upsets and 
preoccupies people so much, because the only thing I am saying is that 
we must construct a national capitalism in Argentina and that we must 
generate an alternative which permits us to mobilize society (idem.). 
We are the only country in the world, along with Russia, which does not 
manage our own oil and oil reserves (idem.: 41). 
I believe firmly in a present State, repairer, protector, promoter, that 
recovers the control of macroeconomic instruments which were 
weakened or disappeared during privatization and the Menem 
period … if the productive system falls and there is no protection from 
the state, who is going to do it? Last year we saw pictures of 
malnourished children, a result of 26 years of neoliberal models and an 
absent state (ibid.:151). 
After being inaugurated on 25 May 2003, Kirchner began an ambitious and focused 
program of recovery. His inaugural speech marked a turning point in the activism of the 
Government in addressing the many consequences of the crisis and in seeking major 
new changes in policies and institutions. Kirchner emphasized the role of economic 
policy, saying: ‘the problems of poverty cannot be solved by social policies but rather 
by economic policies’.2 He argued that a sustained annual growth of 4-5 per cent would 
generate jobs and allow real incomes to double in 15 years. He said that his government 
would follow prudent fiscal policies, improving tax collection and broadening the tax 
base. He spoke of ‘national capitalism’ in which the State would play a greater role in 
infrastructure, housing, and health care. It is interesting to note that three years later, in 
2006, the World Bank commented that: ‘The Government has been consistent in its 
pursuit of these goals and articulate in their elaboration in successive official documents 
and public speeches’ (World Bank 2006). 
                                                 
2  Nestor Kirchner’s Inaugural Speech, 25 May 2003 (quoted in World Bank 2006: 21). 11 
3.2 Sustaining  recovery 
In contrast to external expectations and predictions in the midst of the crisis of 2002, the 
economy grew at an increasing rate from 2003 to 2006, with an average of 9 per cent 
from 2003 to the end of 2005 (Bermudez 2007: 16). On a per capita basis, gross 
domestic product was 7 per cent higher than in 1999. The leading sectors of growth 
were the financial sector (22 per cent), construction (18.6 per cent), and manufacturing 
industries (8.9 per cent). Interestingly, agriculture and livestock only grew at 1.5 per 
cent in 2006, while it had been 11.5 per cent in 2005. This aggregate growth was 
supported by high, if somewhat declining gross fixed investment (idem). 
The initial growth in 2002-03 reflects the use of installed capacity, the legacy of 
investment going back to Peron, and was somewhat predictable. As consumer demand 
picked up in 2004, it was further stoked by investments in advertising by many multi-
national companies, such as Unilever, Danone, Proctor and Gamble, and Johnson and 
Johnson. In fact investment in advertising increased by 26 per cent in 2004 and was 
expected to grow at about the same rate in 2005, suggesting that advertising expenditure 
is a revealing indicator of how multipliers were fed within the domestic market 
(Noticias 2005).  
High investment rates continued in 2005-06. In fact the 2006 investment level was the 
highest in 26 years. Investment was 18.7 per cent higher in 2006, twice as fast as growth 
of the economy as a whole. Domestic gross fixed investment was 21.7 per cent of GDP, 
higher than any time since 1998 when it reached 21.1 per cent. These high rates of 
investment were in turn supported by continuing high rates of private consumption, 
generating the demand for new goods and services. This heavily urban consumption 
process fuelled growth rates as well in 2007, reaching 8.5 per cent, before the economy 
began to cool down in 2008.  
4  In search of urban policy in a time of crisis 
This story contrasts sharply with international narratives on Argentina’s recovery from 
the crisis of 2001-02 which tend to emphasize the role of rising commodity prices and 
growing demand from China. Argentina is said to have been ‘lucky’, saved by global 
demand for its agricultural exports. The international narrative was also later used by 
local agricultural exporters to justify their objections against higher export taxes during 
periods of high commodity prices, especially soya in 2008. These narratives are not 
correct. As presented above, data on the country’s recovery from 2002 through 2007 
show that it was not led by agricultural exports but was fuelled first by urban demand 
and production. When the Convertibility period ended—and with it the dollar-peso 
parity—and the peso was devalued in 2002, price increases for imports stimulated the 
production of domestic goods and services for consumers. This production in turn 
generated multiplier effects which supported small and medium-sized firms and helped 
to create many new jobs. This later produced a revival of the construction and then the 
manufacturing sectors as well. 
The contribution of the campo to the recovery came later in 2004 and thereafter, as the 
prices of commodities increased and the planting of larger and larger areas to grow soya 
and other crops had huge payoffs. These exports certainly helped build up the country’s 12 
reserves and fiscal strength during 2004 to 2008, but they cannot be credited with 
playing the key role in stimulating the recovery. Agricultural exports generated much 
additional income and eventually public revenue, but Argentina’s recovery was largely 
a ‘demand-led recovery’, located in urban areas where 80 per cent of Argentines work 
and live.  
The Argentine case is significant because it suggests that the urban locus of macro-
economic phenomena in Latin America deserves much more research and appreciation 
from policymakers. The historical foci in Latin American urban studies on squatter 
settlements and infrastructure deficits, social exclusion, civil society mobilization, 
decentralization, and the ‘right to the city’ are all important subjects. But these bodies of 
work have ignored the central fact that more than 60 per cent of GDP in all Latin 
American countries comes from urban-based economic activities. The economic and 
social futures of Latin America lie in urban areas which are at once the sites of 
productivity and the loci of urban poverty.  
Given the relatively high productivity of urban-based economic activities in Latin 
American countries, an important question concerns the constraints to higher 
productivity growth. These constraints certainly include, among others, infrastructure 
deficits, selected regulatory controls, the lack of effective urban finance institutions, and 
mixed performance by local governments, despite the two decades of decentralization of 
authority to municipal governments. 
One of the major constraints to productivity growth, however, is intra-urban inequality 
itself. As cited above in the case of Buenos Aires, the allocation of public investment 
resources has contributed to enormous differences in the quality of life and economic 
opportunities for various urban income groups (Cohen and Debowicz 2001). These 
patterns also exist in many other cities in Latin America, such as Bogota, Rio de 
Janeiro, or Mexico City. This form of intra-urban inequality cannot be blamed on the 
multilateral financial institutions or even on the international private sector. Rather, 
much of intra-urban inequality is a local product. 
The issue of supporting productivity increases is obviously one of the key issues in a 
period of economic crisis, whether in 2001-02 or in the current global economic crisis. 
In this regard, it is apparent that investment in urban infrastructure such as water, 
sanitation, or electricity supports firms seeking to expand their operations, particularly 
those located on the urban periphery in Latin American cities where infrastructural 
deficiencies are most pronounced. It also directly helps to create new employment. 
It is significant that the G-20 discussions in London in April 2009 devoted almost no 
recorded attention to urban infrastructure even though most of the ‘demand’ which 
governments wish to stimulate exists within cities. In fact, ‘place’ or ‘sites’ were largely 
ignored in the discussion of macroeconomic measures to be taken. Stimulus packages 
do not occur in cyberspace, they should be firmly rooted on the ground where they can 
have discernable impacts. 
The capacity of Latin American economies to withstand the impact of economic 
downturns, whether from domestic business cycles or global economic crises, ultimately 
depends on how economic policy supports multipliers which operate in local urban 
economies. Urban policy therefore has macroeconomic implications and is far too 
important to be left to the ‘traditional urban disciplines’ such as architecture or urban 13 
planning. Effective policy, however, requires local knowledge beyond the expertise of 
macroeconomists. The challenge of disciplinary collaboration is one more critical 
dimension of the present global economic crisis.  
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